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This article discusses the online activism of Indonesian atheists. While most of the little 
existent scholarship on atheism in Indonesia views the controversial cases in the light of 
the violation of Western-style rights to free speech and religious liberty, a closer look at 
the public discourses both online and offline reveals a more complex picture. The article 
embeds atheist activism and the well-known case of Alexander An in the changing land-
scape of religion and state in post-Suharto Indonesia. It points at the intricate relation-
ship between atheism and blasphemy and shows how activists not only carve a space for 
themselves online, but also seek to counter the negative and anti-religious image that 
decades-long campaigning has created for atheists. Activists use Facebook, Twitter, mes-
saging systems, and forums such as Quora, both to become visible and yet allow for ano-
nymity. Their online communication and activism is often coupled with offline meetings. 
In this way, atheists allow for a thriving ‘community’, and also present atheism positively 
in public. However, to defend atheism this way also has its downsides, as it aligns Indo-
nesian atheists with an international network of mainly Western-funded human rights 
activists and thus runs the risk of further alienating them from a nation that strongly 
defines itself along religious identity.
Keywords: Atheism; Indonesia; Islam; Non-Religious Minorities; Social Media

INTRODUCTION
When self-described Indonesian atheists meet in public places, more common-
ly than not they have already met online. In a space that allows for the use of 
pseudonyms, hundreds of skeptics find like-minded doubters and non-believers 
in a society where religiosity is the norm. Across the archipelago, these atheists 
regularly organize offline meetings. Some just want to watch a movie or share 
a meal with fellow non-believers, while others want to discuss the difficulties 
of having to pretend to be religious for their families and colleagues, or to par-
take in religious rituals for fear of reprisals. All of them are aware of the stakes 
involved in framing their activities as ‘atheism’, especially since 2012, when Al-
exander An, a civil servant in the Dharmasraya regency of West Sumatra, was 
first attacked and then imprisoned by local authorities for his Facebook posts 
against Islam. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International called 
for his unconditional release, while Muslim hardline organizations such as the 
Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) demanded his execution. Fi-
nally, the local judges at the Muaro Sijunjung district court found him guilty of 
disseminating hatred and sentenced him to two and a half years of prison (Hu-
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man Rights Watch, 2013). For many human rights activists, this case is a proof that 
atheism is being officially prohibited in Indonesia. Yet, atheism is only one of several 
‘-isms’ that have been discussed controversially in the post-Suharto era. After verbal 
and semi-legal attacks against “sekularisme, pluralisme dan liberalisme” (“secularism, 
pluralism, and liberalism”) in the mid-2000s (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2005; Gil-
lespie, 2007), and the rejection of an appeal to revoke the so-called blasphemy law in 
2010, the so called Aan case (Aan being Alexander An’s nickname) sparked a heated 
debate on ateisme, and on the state’s regulation of religion and irreligion. Like sekular-
isme, pluralisme, and liberalisme, ateisme is a controversial term, and most Indonesians 
would frown at someone’s declaration of being an atheist.1
The term seems to carry a certain dose of hostility against religion, and thus peo-
ple’s understandings for moral conduct. Human rights activists and foreign as well as 
local scholars interpret the case as a straightforward example of growing intolerance 
and the shrinking space for expressing non-religious views in Indonesia (Hasani, 
2016). However, there is more to the case than the question of freedom of expression. 
In this paper, I examine the case of Alexander An from a discourse-oriented perspec-
tive. I argue that this case served as a discursive battleground for reconfiguration of 
the relationship between the state and religion. Nationalists, liberals, and promot-
ers of varying nuances of the political involvement of religion have been rethinking 
the position of Islam vis-à-vis the state with new fervor since the fall of Suharto in 
1998. In these discourses, a new voice is slowly beginning to rise and enter public 
discourses via online platforms: A number of Indonesian atheist activists today are 
striving to carve out a legitimate presence for atheist identities. Yet, after decades of 
demonization as ‘communists’ since 1965/1966, during which religiosity became an 
expression of being anti-communist (Bertrand, 2004, p. 74), this form of social activ-
ism is still highly controversial.
Adopting critical discourse analysis, this article focuses on the case of Alexander 
An because of its dialectical relationship with the social structures and institutions 
which frame it. In other words, “the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also 
shapes them” (Wodak & Fairclough, 1997, p. 258). This article thus eschews any de-
tailed discussion of the history or contemporary practices and intellectual discus-
sions related to atheism, but rather seeks to situate the case of Alexander An in the 
public discourse on religious minorities and on the changing relationship between 
religion and the state. It analyzes how this case became so widely discussed, and how 
it changed the discourse on Islam and the state. The case of Alexander An is a critical 
point of entry for broader questions on non-belief and online activism in Indonesia 
that have been widely discussed by local and international media and human rights 
reports, but that have not yet been the focus of scholarly research. Critical questions 
with this regard are: What did Aan’s opponents and the state find so offensive about 
his comments, and how does this case relate to atheism and the online presence of 
non-belief in Indonesia more generally. To answer these questions, this article un-
packs the circumstances under which Aan’s case became an offence to the state. The 
main method employed is media analysis, complemented by online and offline con-
1 I observed this during my fieldwork on notions of orthodoxy and deviance in Indonesia. Between 2008 
and 2014, I spent several periods of altogether 18 months in various cities and towns across Java.
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versations and interviews during and after my fieldwork in Java between 2009 and 
2013 when I was working on deviant sects, or aliran sesat. The Aan case opens a win-
dow to a small but well-connected group of activists who use the Internet to push 
the boundaries of the sayable and tolerable. Given the aggressive climate that works 
against the public propagation of atheism in Indonesia today, as indicated by the case 
itself, online forums and chat groups are the only promising space that allows for 
atheist expressions – a space where a concerned group of atheists strives to educate 
an Internet-savvy public about their lives and non-religious views. What they insist 
on is the possibility of non-belief without insulting religion, which I will illustrate 
in some examples below. The case of Alexander An and the online presence of other 
atheist activists form an ideal site to study the boundaries of what is publicly tolerable 
and to investigate under what conditions these boundaries become contested.
THE AAN CASE AND ATHEISM IN INDONESIA
More generally speaking, scholarship on irreligion differentiates between atheists 
and people without any religious affiliation. Atheism usually refers to not believing in 
the existence of one or several gods, and non-religion refers to either those without 
beliefs or those whose beliefs are not recognized as religious. Some of the academic 
literature on this subject (e.g., Beaman & Tomlins, 2014; Lee, 2015) points at the broad 
palette of nuances, ranging from non-theist religious practice to irreligious beliefs, 
which often gets overshadowed by the crooked binary of atheism versus religion. In 
Indonesia, however, the state’s foundational political principles of Pancasila prescribe 
to its people monotheism, since religion or agama is per se defined as the belief in one 
god only. In this context, even Hinduism is constructed as a monotheistic religion 
(McDaniel, 2013). Besides the six officially recognized religions, the Indonesian Con-
stitution also recognizes kepercayaan, literally belief, to refer to local beliefs which are 
not referred to as atheism, and are not part of the discourse on atheism. Thus, while 
they may not necessarily be similar elsewhere, in the context of Indonesia, atheism 
and non-belief mean one and the same thing. In addition to the more general dif-
ferentiation between atheism and non-belief, a growing scholarly work focuses on 
different kinds of atheism such as, for example, negative atheism, which is defined as 
the not-believing in the existence of a god, or positive atheism, or the believing that 
there is no god (Martin, 2007). These categorizations, however, are mainly based on 
Western experiences (which self-evidently is not to say that non-Western experiences 
of irreligiosity and non-belief do not exist; they just have not informed the currently 
globally salient category of atheism). In many societies where religion and state are 
more formally connected and constitute the social norm, atheists are too concerned 
about even voicing their skepticism to refine their disbelief. The atheists that this 
article focuses on demonstrate a newly forming identity in Indonesian society today. 
After decades of worrying about being associated with communism – still a deeply 
stigmatized category, even 60 years after the mass-killings in the transition period 
leading to the New Order – a loose network of activists is attempting to rehabilitate 
the term ateis. They claim not only the right to not believe in the existence of God, but 
also the right to express this skepticism or disbelief in public. Many of them remain 
anonymous online, but their nicknames and their frequent use of English suggest a 
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cosmopolitan upbringing or outlook: Some, yet not all of the activists, belong to the 
Indonesian diaspora. A more detailed look at the case reveals that Alexander An was 
not simply imprisoned for being an atheist, or even for creating an online platform 
for atheists – almost 1000 Facebook users supported (‘liked’) his Facebook fan page 
entitled Ateis Minang. Aan went much further than publicly announcing his disbelief 
and inviting others to discuss it with him. In January 2012, one of his posts read: “If 
God exists, why do bad things happen? . . . There should only be good things if God 
is merciful”. He then declared heaven, hell, angels, and devils to be myths (mitos) and 
posted an article describing Muhammad as “attracted to his daughter-in-law” as well 
as comic strips depicting him and a servant during sexual intercourse (Bachyul, 2012; 
McKinnon, 2012). These posts go beyond mere statements of atheism. They combine 
an atheist stance with anti-Islamic commentary. Shortly after these posts, on his way 
to work, Aan was violently attacked. Rather than arresting the perpetrators, the po-
lice took Aan into protective custody. He was later charged with religious blasphemy, 
atheism propagation, and dissemination of religious hostility. Prosecutors sought a 
three-and-a-half-year jail term for him. In June 2012, the court eventually convicted 
him of the most serious charge and decided to drop the other two. The judge found 
Aan guilty of having violated Article 28 of the Information and Electronic Transac-
tion Law, more precisely of “disseminating information aimed at inciting religious 
hatred or hostility” (Amnesty International, 2012). For this, the court sentenced Aan 
to two and a half years of imprisonment and a fine of IDR 100 million. 
Public commentary on the case reflects the broadness of the spectrum of respons-
es to avowals of atheism in Indonesia. On the respective Facebook page alone, com-
ments ranged from calls for beheading Aan to vocal support of his cause. Several 
national as well as international human rights groups called for his release; Amnesty 
International, for example, filed him under its category “prisoner of conscience” (Ab-
bott, 2014). At the other end of the spectrum, the Islamic Society Forum (Forum Umat 
Islam, FUI) insisted that a five-year jail term for Aan would not suffice: “He deserves 
the death penalty, even if he decides to repent. What he has done cannot be tolerated. 
It is important to prevent this group from spreading atheism in this country”, said 
the organization’s Secretary General Muhammad al-Khaththath (“Calls to Behead”, 
2012). It cannot fully be determined whether their hatred was sparked by Aan’s de-
clared disbelief, or by the insults he had posted. Human rights reports and a number 
of newspaper articles simply claimed that Aan was sentenced for his atheism. But 
atheism itself, albeit uncommon and shunned, is not illegal in Indonesia. It was not 
his non-belief that Aan was punished for, Aan was punished for making his atheism 
public in a particular way. It appears that it was the public display of non-belief and 
anti-religious views that crossed the border of what is acceptable. Among the 240 
million Indonesians classified as Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, Hindu, or 
Confucian, there are many who do not believe in any god. Among those, many joke 
about or question religious beliefs in small groups. But the difference between these 
atheists and atheist activists such as Aan, is that the latter claim their right to speak 
publicly about their views – they claim their share of public space. Aan strengthened 
this visibility by using his real name. Thus, he was targeted for spreading (menyebar) 
atheist beliefs. Many atheist activists would argue that they do not wish to convert 
believers to atheism, but that they simply want to be accepted in their non-religious 
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identity. But the line between acceptance and missionary intentions is blurred: Great-
er acceptance and visibility of a belief or conviction, circulating details concerning 
practices, and the possibility of discussion all have the potential to lure those out of 
the closet2 who have hitherto been in hiding. In Indonesia, the accusation of prosely-
tization weighs heavy. Ever since the first European encounters, and especially since 
the days of anti-colonial struggle, many Muslims have been worried about foreigners 
spreading Christianity, or Christianization (kristenisasi) (Boland, 1971, p. 230; Steen-
brink, 1998, pp. 329-330). In the post-independence period, fear of conflict through 
proselytization was so widespread that it was legally prohibited (Steenbrink, 1998, p. 
330). Until today, the Proselytizing Guidelines (Ministerial Decision No. 77/1978) and 
the Guidelines for Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia (Ministerial 
Decision No. 20/1978) regulate and restrict the dissemination of religious convic-
tions. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that many Indonesians keep a close and 
skeptical eye on the public visibility of atheists.
Two main factors seem to have contributed to the sentence against Alexander 
An. First, what many presented as a case of atheism came in combination with what 
was perceived as a deliberate insult of Islam. In fact, the case could be analytically re-
duced to blasphemy if one were to ignore the discursive event surrounding it, which 
presented the categories of atheism and insult as deeply enmeshed. Second, the out-
rage this case sparked among different circles positioned it on a public stage. Arjun 
Appadurai’s (2006) work on inter-ethnic conflict helps to understand why even ‘small 
numbers’ are often, as in this case, perceived as a major threat to national majorities. 
Nationalism, he argues – and this applies to many interpretations of religion as well 
– is ultimately built on notions of exceptionalism, namely the belief that a national 
ethnic or a particular religious group is unique and ultimately different to, if not bet-
ter than others. This uniqueness is based on narratives of certain shared character-
istics, and minorities challenge such narratives of social cohesion and homogeneity. 
In Indonesia, the dominant narrative is that of religious harmoni. Aan’s statements 
can thus be viewed as a visible impurity. The visibility of non-belief coupled with 
anti-Islamic sentiments thus challenges the narrative of both ummat Indonesia and a 
multi-religious but monotheistic and harmonious Indonesian society. 
The major challenging factor of the Aan case is not so much atheism or even the 
blasphemous insult per se, but rather the spreading or, in the words of the court’s 
sentencing, “the disseminating of information” (Mahkamah Agung Republik Indone-
sia, 2012). It is not so much the contents of Aan’s message, but the quality and eventu-
ally the produce of their dissemination. During the sentencing, the presiding judge 
Eka Prasetya Budi Dharma described Aan’s actions as having caused “anxiety to the 
community and tarnished Islam” (“keresahan dalam masyarakat dan menodai Islam”) 
(Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, 2012). This judgement was linked to the le-
2 Activists speak of “being in the closet” and “coming out”, either in English or in direct translation, as 
in keluar dari kloset/kakus. “Closeted” and “in the closet” is a central metaphor of the 20th century LGBTQ 
movement. It describes people who have not disclosed their sexual orientation or gender identity, and who 
hide a part of their personality because of social pressure (Sedgwick, 1990; Seidman, Meeks, & Traschen, 
1999). Those who use this metaphor to refer to atheists argue that most atheists hide their critical stance 
toward religion in order to remain safe, or simply in order to avoid harassment, and that they suffer from 
having to hide part of their identity.
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gal upholding of the so-called blasphemy law in 2010: After a group of activists had 
demanded its revocation, the judges explicitly declared that Indonesia is a country 
with belief in God, not an atheist country, and that campaigning for the freedom not 
to have a religion was neither provided for, nor possible in Indonesia (Crouch, 2012; 
Menchik, 2016; Schäfer, 2013). In both cases, the judges were careful to reach a com-
promise between extreme demands. The second aspect this case reveals is that there 
is a liberal public in Indonesia that demands not only the right to publicly express its 
non-belief, but also, inextricably, the right to blaspheme. While many atheist activ-
ists work hard to maintain a respectful and positive relationship with believers, oth-
ers conclude that they can only fully exercise their right to free speech if there is no 
exception for religious sentiments. One might argue that their situation in Indonesia 
forces non-believers and those deemed deviant to demand the right to blaspheme, 
since any atheist statement is prone to be punished under Indonesia’s blasphemy 
laws. Blasphemy and atheism are thus deeply enmeshed. Atheist activists cannot es-
cape this matter, and they use it to push forward their demand to the right to speak 
their mind freely: No atheist activist can seriously campaign for his or her right to 
speak freely on the basis of their non-religious identity without also demanding a 
public space for blasphemy. Outspoken atheists are not only different from most In-
donesians. For those who fear religious insult, they are the ‘blasphemous other’. It is 
this particular connection between atheism and blasphemy together with its public 
delivery that caused the case of Alexander An to explode.3
INDONESIA’S BLASPHEMY LAWS AND ONLINE MEDIA
In 1961, President Sukarno accepted the selection of six religions as suggested by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs. Based on the four criteria of having a holy scripture, a 
prophet, one lordship, and a system of rules for its followers, Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism became officially and legally 
recognized religions in the young Republic of Indonesia.4 Arising from the effort to 
satisfy the faction that demanded an official place for Islam in the formation of the 
independent state without excluding the adherents of other religions, the fifth prin-
ciple of the official state ideology Pancasila prescribed the belief in “One Lordship” 
or “Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa” (Darmaputera, 1988, pp. 84, 153).5 But despite these 
regulations, the formal adherence to a religion is not prescribed constitutionally.6
Indonesian atheists today face difficulties on two legal levels: the level of regis-
tration of religious affiliation, and the level of banned blasphemy. The Indonesian 
national identity card requires filling in a religious affiliation. Although it is legally 
3 Elsewhere, I have concluded that the combination of visibility, foreignness (real or ascribed), and grow-
ing numbers of followers (real or reported) are highly likely to make a group a target (Schäfer, 2015).
4 After being banned at various times, Confucianism has again been officially recognized as a religion 
since 2006.
5 Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa has been translated in various ways, but the choice of words, which Eka 
Darmaputera convincingly argues can only be correctly translated as “One Lordship” (Darmaputera, 1988, 
pp. 84, 153), suggests that it was intended to prescribe monotheism.
6 For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional situation of atheists, see Hasani (2016, pp. 201-
205).
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possible to register as not adhering to any religion by filling in “not existent” (“tidak 
ada”) in the blank space provided for the category of religion, very few actually make 
use of this option. Many bureaucrats refuse to oblige, and the danger of being dis-
criminated when registering at school, at university, or at work is considerable. Many 
atheists say they fear repercussions when they are known to be non-believers.7 Even 
greater is the legal difficulty in the case of marriage. Indonesian law has no provision 
for non-religious civil marriages. According to the marriage law of 1974, every mar-
riage needs to undergo a religious ceremony led by an officially recognized religious 
leader in order to be recognized as a legal marriage by the state. The other set of 
laws that atheists may face difficulties with are the anti-blasphemy laws. Religious 
blasphemy is prohibited in Indonesia under Law No. 1/PNPS/1965. Within the Penal 
Code, blasphemy is prohibited under Article 156a. Paragraph (a) of this article em-
ploys a vague language in its prohibition of any acts and expressions of views which 
are considered to be blasphemous, and carries a maximum punishment of five years 
imprisonment. A similar maximum punishment is also carried by paragraph (b) of the 
same article, which prohibits any acts and expressions of views calling for others to 
embrace atheism. Further, Article 28 of the 2008 Information and Electronic Trans-
action Law makes the dissemination of information aimed at inflicting hatred based 
on ethnicity and religion punishable. Both laws are often used against individuals 
who are considered deviants within their own religions, or who are accused of insult-
ing a particular religion, for instance by mocking religious practices or prophets. Yet, 
only the latter is the one applied in the case of Alexander An. This move undoubtedly 
aimed at encouraging self-censorship and robbed Indonesians of the illusion that the 
Internet is an unregulated space.
In 2015, Freedom House ranked Indonesia as “Partly Free”, with a score of 42 
(midway between 0 as best and 100 as worst) (Freedom House, 2015). In Indonesia, 
this type of freedom – the kind that is bound to the Western notion of freedom of 
speech – is more easily obtained on the Internet than in print media, on TV, or on 
the radio (Lim, 2012). This is at least partly due to the inconsistency of Indonesia’s 
Internet regulations, and because digital spheres allow for the use of pseudonyms. 
While pseudonyms and second accounts could technically be traced back, the of-
fence at stake here is not the type that aggravates a tightly controlling state – such 
as in the case of Thailand, or China – but rather sits unevenly with members of the 
public. Those who oppose atheists or religious and political diversity do not have the 
sophisticated means that would be necessary to trace Internet users. Their technical 
limits mean more online freedom for those who wish to make their ideas visible, but 
not themselves. Alexander An decided to not make use of a pseudonym, but openly 
revealed his identity. This may have prompted the physical attack on him and, shortly 
after, his imprisonment. Yet, many Indonesians seem to have learned from his expe-
rience, as they make ample use of the anonymity that the Internet still offers today. 
Indonesia’s media landscape is vibrant and open, with few certainties and sometimes 
surprising restrictions. Before 1998, media was highly supervised both by the Min-
istry of Information and through mechanisms of self-censorship (Hill, 1994). Issues 
7 Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006) have shown a high likeliness of being discriminated also for US-
American non-believers despite increasing acceptance of religious diversity in the states.
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that were not to be openly discussed included suku (ethnicity or tribal affiliation), 
agama (religion), ras (race), and antar golongan (groups with different affiliations and 
background), also known under the acronym SARA.
Journalists were expected to avoid these topics and to take positions stressing 
national unity. Since then, freedom of expression has increased considerably and 
the Indonesian media are now considered among the freest in Asia. However, re-
strictions and regulations remain. International observers from Reporters Without 
Borders ranked the country 132nd out of 180 countries in their 2014 World Press 
Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders, 2014). Indonesia ranks that low, not so 
much because of media censorship or government control, but mainly because of 
the murders of several journalists which were never properly resolved or prosecuted. 
Issues such as corruption or Papua’s struggle for greater autonomy are among those 
topics that are still particularly dangerous to discuss in public. Besides legal regula-
tions and violence against journalists, ownership is an important factor that affects 
Indonesia’s media landscape. Despite fairly diverse media ownership patterns, busi-
ness networks rapidly gain influence vis-à-vis the state (Hill & Sen, 2012). Today, in 
Indonesia, more than 55 million people use the Internet regularly to access various 
websites – including the websites of local and national newspapers – with almost 
half of them surfing the web via mobile devices. Mobile phones are an important sta-
tus symbol in Indonesia (Pousttchi & Wiedemann, 2009, p. 148). The country boasts 
the world’s second largest number of Facebook users and the third largest number 
of Twitter users (Indonesia Investments, 2014). The majority of young Indonesians 
have grown up in a very mobile, fast-moving society in which mobile phones have 
been one of the easiest ways to stay in touch with family and friends back in the left-
behind hometown. The digital divide disadvantages rural areas and ensures faster, 
more regular, and more reliable access to the Internet to urban Indonesians. Among 
these urbanites are those who have grown up with a cosmopolitan outlook on indi-
viduals and society. Many of them compare practices at home with those they find 
on TV and online, and situate themselves in a broader frame of reference than the 
village, the city, or even the nation state. Their global outlook becomes apparent in 
their consumption of both international as well as national English-language media; 
their frequent use of English in discussion boards; and either their applications for 
studies abroad, or their fondness of movies whose main characters often live torn 
between their loved ones back in Indonesia and their studies abroad. Among these 
cosmopolitan urbanites are those who actively seek to broaden the spectrum of ac-
ceptable identities in Indonesian public discourse.
ONLINE ATHEIST ACTIVISM AS A CLAIM TO PUBLIC SPACE
Online activism for atheism forms maybe the most important frontline in the broad 
campaign for the right to freely express skepticism toward religion. Atheist groups 
have systematically and regularly maintained online groups, discussion threads, and 
websites in order to make their views public to an Internet-savvy audience. The activ-
ist group Indonesian Atheists, founded in 2008, has its own blog decorated with its 
own logo; it also maintains the most popular Facebook group and is active on You-
Tube and Twitter. Its founder is Karl Karnadi, an Indonesian expat in Germany and 
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the US. Eight years after its founding, it reached 1700 members (who call themselves 
Indonesian Atheists).8 Another group is the Indonesian Atheist Community, with 
about 500 likes on their Facebook fan page.9 Many sign into the group with their real 
names, while others establish a second account with a pseudonym to protect their 
identity, either for safety reasons or for fear of alienating their families. Some share 
stories of being disowned by their parents, and so there is not a general encourage-
ment of ‘coming out’ as an atheist. Another popular group on Facebook, Indonesian 
Atheist Parents, is dedicated to questions of atheist parenting. This is a closed group 
with about 400 members.10 Atheists with children discuss questions of religious edu-
cation and of raising children without faith in a society in which religiosity is the 
norm. These groups mainly function as forums for atheists and non-believers to ex-
change their experiences.
In addition to these online forums, atheist groups organize regular offline meet-
ings. These often have less of an activist character, but are gatherings for dinner or 
movie-watching, offering an opportunity to “[have] fun with fellow nonbelievers, 
where they can be themselves for a while and not [have] to pretend (to be religious 
or someone they’re not)” (Karl Karnadi, 7 February 2016). From these general offline 
meetings, smaller activist groups emerge and continue their communication online 
via instant messaging systems such as WhatsApp and LINE. The constant threat of 
physical violence is one of the reasons why atheist campaigning continues to thrive 
online. Another related reason is that atheists often become outspoken only after 
they have left Indonesia to live abroad. Members of the Indonesian diaspora support 
atheist activism in the motherland by publicly showing their face and name without 
the same fear of attacks that they would suffer in Indonesia.11
Besides serving as meeting platforms, online groups and websites also provide a 
space for atheism in a semi-public realm. Atheists gather online not only to exchange 
experiences and opinions but also to educate an Internet-savvy public about their 
own perspectives. This becomes clear in the online forum Anda Bertanya Ateis Men-
jawab (You Ask, Atheists Respond). The group is also active on Facebook and Twitter. 
Here, a group of activists “positively interact[s] with the public through [a] strongly 
moderated Q&A format” to “soften the devilish image of atheists” in the Indonesian 
public (Karl Karnadi, 7 February 2016). On their Facebook page, liked by more than 
55.000 users12 , they share information on atheism, but also regularly post greetings 
on major religious holidays such as Muslims’ Eid, Christians’ Christmas, or Chinese 
Happy Lunar New Year. After decades of demonization, this online outreach and the 
8 While some members will only join the group to inform themselves over its activities, it is safe to 
conclude that the number of its members does correlate with the significance of the group. For more 
information, see Indonesian Atheists’ Facebook fan page at https://www.facebook.com/groups/
indonesianatheists/?fref=ts.
9 In October 2016, the site had 496 likes.
10 In October 2016, the group had 400 members.
11 This is not to say that activism is restricted to diaspora Indonesians; it is just easier for them to use 
their real names. From the comments on the respective websites, it is clear that many participants in the 
online discussions are based in Indonesian cities. Users have hitherto organized offline meetings in at least 
nine cities, including Jakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Malang in Java, Medan in 
Aceh, and various places in Bali. Indonesians abroad organize their own meetings.
12 This number refers to October 2016.
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notion of community that these websites and forums create in tandem with regular 
offline meetings seem to help soften social schisms, and even indicate efforts to dif-
ferentiate between different facets of non-belief.
This mixture of online and offline engagement is reminiscent of gay parades, 
where the mass character of the event together with practices of donning masks and 
costumes allowed homosexuals to gather and spend time together, and to simultane-
ously be present and visible in the public space without exposing themselves to the 
same vulnerability that they would risk in daily life. In other words, online forums, 
groups, and websites have a double function: Firstly, they offer atheists a space to 
seek advice and exchange opinions and strategies; secondly, and more importantly, 
they make visible their claim to the right to exist as non-believers. Atheist activists 
use the Internet as a semi-public space that allows them to be simultaneously visible 
and anonymous. Online activism gives atheists a share of the public realm and allows 
their cause to be visible and present.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL ACTIVISTS
The skepticism toward atheism stems from its supposedly direct link to communism 
reflected, for example, in the reactions to the 1949 novel Ateis by Achdiat Karta Mi-
hardja, in which the lead character, a Muslim called Hasan, begins to question his 
faith after conversations with his Marxist-Leninist friends. Several comments uttered 
by politicians in the years to follow show how atheism was ideologically constructed 
as connected to communism (Hasani, 2016, p. 199). Today, much of the skepticism 
toward atheism is framed in and enhanced by its international dimension, particu-
larly in connection to Western societies and governments. In addition to the atten-
tion which Western media cast upon the issue, and which some Indonesians are well 
aware of, recognition from abroad comes in two forms: Via the language of human 
rights and via the international support from other atheist organizations. Both entail 
not only moral, but also financial support, particularly in the legal realm. Locally, 
many look at these connections skeptically, and accuse local NGOs of being subvert-
ed agents of foreign interests. Notwithstanding, many atheists debate their existence 
in the vocabulary of human rights. Indeed, the language of human rights has become 
omnipresent in Indonesia since 1998. The reformasi period brought a mushrooming 
of civil society organizations, and many of them rely entirely on foreign support from 
USAID, AusAID, and so forth. Those organizations not only speak the language of 
human rights themselves, but also disseminate this language into Indonesian society 
through their public outreach in newspapers and other media, and through the jar-
gon of applications. Salaries from international agencies are often not only competi-
tive but generous, and many educated Indonesians regularly try to get their activism 
funded by an international agency. An important aspect of the human rights regime 
is the increased importance of the concept of minority since the early 1990s.13 In 
their 2013 report on “Abuses Against Religious Minorities”, Human Rights Watch dis- 
cusses the case of Alexander An at length, thereby suggesting that atheists are a reli-
13 Two minority agendas are reflected in the “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Na-
tional or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”, adopted by the UN in 1992, and the “Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, adopted in 2007.
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gious minority in need of protection (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Atheist organiza-
tions in Indonesia not only speak the language of human rights, but focus on the right 
to non-belief. For them, agnosticism, humanism, or atheism, are group identities that 
deserve state protection. They advocate for those they perceive as part of their group. 
In the case of Alexander An, the American Humanist Association – a US-American 
organization that provides legal assistance to defend the rights of non-religious and 
religious minorities and actively lobbies for the separation between church and the 
state in the United States and abroad – discussed his case and offered to assist him 
with legal support (Bulger, n.d.). This foreign recognition further strengthens athe-
ism as an identity category. As a comment by Karl Karnadi on the online platform 
Quora illustrates:
When international organizations like Human Rights Watch mentioned athe-
ists as one of Indonesian minority groups for the first time in . . . [sic] probably 
ever, it has brought confidence to many Indonesian atheists. I saw some athe-
ists were starting to come out, even though most of them do it very carefully 
and in limited circles of friends and families. It’s a good start. (“What Is It Like”, 
n.d.)
When they reveal their views, many atheists become disowned by their families 
and find consolidation and support in online communities. Yet, members of online 
communities tell journalists that they are also ready to form an offline community. 
This happened when, in 2013, a large sum of money was donated to a non-believer 
by other atheists, so that he could pay the debts to his estranged father (Schonhardt, 
2013).
For campaigners like Karl Karnadi, the online presence and the connected offline 
meetings of atheist groups are only the beginning of what they envision as an In-
donesian society that holds a place for atheists, just as it holds a place for different 
religious groups. Such a society would, most of all, allow atheists to speak their mind 
openly and publicly, and it would allow them to publicly show their identity as athe-
ists just as others show their identity as Muslims, or Christians. Yet the path they have 
chosen is rather problematic as it builds on the international terminology of identity 
and, hence, underlines their (ir)religious identity. In other words, they claim the right 
to be something rather than the right to do something. By this, they defend the free-
dom of religion rather than the freedom of speech, and thus end up using religion as 
their central frame of reference.
The political theorist Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2015) has investigated the con-
sequences of a religious rights and freedoms model that singles out groups for le-
gal protection as religious groups. According to Hurd, this model molds religious 
groups into discrete faith communities with clean boundaries and governs difference 
through religious rights. Social differences of various kinds get reduced to the catego-
ry of religion. With such a narrow focus, the exploration of reasons for social exclu-
sion and violence gets blocked. The focus on religious affiliation reduces possibilities 
for both understanding of and campaigning against social exclusion. A major effect 
that this sectarianization (Hurd, 2015) has for religious groups is the strengthening 
of boundaries and of claims to orthodoxy and authority. As I have argued elsewhere, 
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the use of online media in tandem with a rhetoric of minority rights has reinforced 
the identities of Shia and Ahmadiyya Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia (Schäfer, 
2015). However, many of the problems of center-staging religious identity do not only 
concern those who are categorized as belonging to a particular religious group, but 
also, comparable to a strong ethnic group identity, apply for atheists and other non-
believers. Atheists and others who vocally distance themselves from religion do so 
by relating themselves to religion or to (ir)religious minorities. In other words, they 
style their own identity as a community within the same model and frame which reli-
gious identities build upon. Religion again becomes the main marker of identity, and 
thus also contributes to what Hurd (2015) calls the “sectarianization” of irreligious or 
atheist groups. Even more so than in the case of those deemed deviants from their 
own officially recognized religion, atheists are vulnerable to this accusation, simply 
because of the term itself. The term ateis is neither of Malay nor Arab origin, but 
derives from ancient Greek. Its foreign taste on the Indonesian tongue (wrongly) sug-
gests that there has never been any local form of non-belief, or belief without gods. 
The perceived ‘foreignness’ of the category invites both religious as well as nationalist 
critics to speculations and conspiracy theories. This hostility is only strengthened by 
the moral and financial support offered by foreign agencies to atheist groups. This 
perceived foreigness of atheism might as well be the reason why those local beliefs 
(kepercayaan) that are not officially recognized as religions and that are not centered 
on a particular deity were rarely attacked of being blasphemous, as atheist expres-
sions were and continue to be today.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: FORMING FORBIDDEN IDENTITIES ONLINE
Formally, post-Suharto Indonesia is neither a religious, nor a non-religious state. 
When the judges upheld the old laws against blasphemy in 2010, they declared that 
Indonesia is a country with belief in one god, not an atheist country. Even though 
atheism is not technically illegal, religious affiliation is the norm. It is enshrined in 
the Pancasila, the state philosophy, and it is preserved in various laws, such as the 
marriage law, as well as in other administrative practices, such as the official ID card. 
Blasphemy is punishable by law, and with blurred boundaries, some atheist activism 
is deemed blasphemous by the state. The key aspect here is not the content of the 
message per se, but its visibility, which has been on the rise since the introduction of 
new media technologies in Indonesia.
In a media landscape where journalists often financially depend upon the people 
they report about, the Internet has become a very important platform for self-repre-
sentation and the dissemination of dissent. For those who do not have the resources 
to pay journalists for favorable reporting, the Internet offers an array of possibilities. 
They can not only design their own long-term web presence, but also transmit their 
own perspectives via social media. In Indonesia, the persecuted Ahmadiyya commu-
nity has experimented with its own YouTube channel (Schäfer, 2015), and has also 
successfully secured a place for Ahmadi perspectives in talk shows and reports. In a 
similar vein, atheist activists, many of whom live abroad, use the Internet to make 
their own voices heard. In a sectarianized society in which religion occupies central 
stage, some atheist activists fit their views and the discrimination against them by 
265Forming ‘Forbidden’ Identities Online
turning atheism into a visible form of identity, standing side by side with the reli-
gious ones. When they avoid using their real names, the Internet allows activists to 
exchange views and to become visible without exposing themselves to the danger 
of violent attacks. In the same way, they use the Internet as a semi-public space to 
establish an identity that is formally discouraged in Indonesia. Not only did the Indo-
nesian society discourage atheism within its long-lasting campaign against commu-
nism – also the Indonesian state, in principle, sanctions atheism and public atheist 
identities, as in the case of Alexander An, who coupled his atheist online presence 
with anti-Islamic insults and thus overstepped the line of what is tolerable in a reli-
giously defined public sphere.
The Aan case, however, produced a heightened awareness and sensitivity about 
the state’s regulation of belief. It also revitalized the public debate about what is and 
is not publicly tolerable and about the state’s role in limiting the freedom of speech 
in matters of religious sensitivities. Those who opposed a relaxed attitude toward 
what should publicly be tolerable were able to demonstrate the limits they wanted 
to impose. Moreover, the state used the opportunity to reiterate its middle-ground 
stance on religious matters, as already demonstrated in the 2010 blasphemy law 
controversy. The international attention that the case garnered, together with the 
online network of various atheist websites that commented on the case, show how 
the Indonesian atheist community is further boosted, and also determined by inter-
national support. This is done not only through the increasing demand for religious 
freedom and the prevailing language of human rights, but also through moral and fi-
nancial provisions of international atheist organizations flowing to their Indonesian 
counterparts. In this context, sectarian identity becomes ever more important: The 
campaigns of international organizations encourage much more sharply differenti-
ated profiles of Indonesian atheists – and other minorities – than they might other-
wise adopt. Thus, for Indonesian atheist activists, their newly gained visibility and 
confidence brings about the danger of reducing their identity to their stance toward 
religion at large. These markers of difference concentrate pressure at precisely the 
spot where the Indonesian society is most sensitive. In a nation that is already rapidly 
fragmenting into various religious and political camps, the growth of internationally 
well-connected communities may thus increase social tensions within society. Yet, 
for those whom online activism has enabled to ‘come out of the closet’ and finally 
connect with likeminded non-believers in Indonesia and abroad, this sacrifice might 
be worth the price.

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